Www~Cs:cInu.edu/People/spok/banned-books.html), Blue Ribbon Campaign (http:/ / www.eff.org/blueribbon.hhnl), Center for Democracy and Technology (http://www. cdt.org), Electronic Frontier Foundation (http://www.eff.org), Freedom To Read Week 1996 (http://www.cycor.ca/pwac/freeweek.htm). John Perry Barlow's Cyberspace Independence Declaration (http://www.eff.org/pub /Publications/John_Perry_Barlow I barlow_o296.declaration), Newswatch Canada (http://edwina.cprost.sfu.ca/newswatch), and Voters Telecommunications Watch (http://www.vlw.org). 11 Another such issue, one not addressed here, concerns the subjectivity of goods and harms, including the subjective value of belief and its expression. As Mill observes, 'The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it' (Mill, 14) . Later he adds, 'Before quitting the subject of freedom of opinion, it is fit to take some notice of those who say that the free expression of aU opinions should be permitted on condition that the manner be temperate, and do not pass the bounds of fair discussion. Much might be said on the impossibility of fixing where these supposed bounds are to be placed; for if the test be offence to those whose opinions are attacked, I think experience testifies that this offence is given wheneve'r the attack is telling and powerful and every opponent who pushes them hard, and whom they find it difficult to answer, appears to
Of course, many aspects of the censorship debate have been settled, at least in principle. Within the Western democracies, there is broad and effective consensus that the presumption is rightly in favour of free expression, and that the burden of proof rests on those who wish to censor, or in some other way restrict or control, the flow of information. Most citizens and legislators agree that this arrangement is essentiat both for individual liberty and for sound government. They also agree that principled reasons can and do exist for regulating and sometimes limiting this basic freedom.
In essence these broad claims are usually justified by some combination of arguments such as the following. The corporate life of any people requires a complex network of social institutions and practices which, in large measure, depends upon both political consensus and the rule of law.
In a democracy, all political power ultimately rests with the citizenry. As a result, laws and institutions must eventually find their groWld in the sovereign will of the people. Since it is only with the free expression of ideas of all kinds that citizens are ultimately able to exercise their political sovereignty, free speech serves as the foundation for a broad range of political and dvilliberties. As a result, it is generally agreed that regulation stops, and censorship begins, when adult citizens are unable to gain access to non-proprietary ideas and information which are of interest to them and which are of no direct and immediate harm to others.
As this slogan indicates, some regulations and restrictions on the movement of ideas and information do remain justified. For one thing, inform a tion, like other goods, may be owned. Freedom of infonnation laws do not give us the right to open each other's mail or to gain access to each other's bank balances. It is also recognized that words can harm. As a result, there are long-standing principles governing defamation 12 and the intentional propagation of falsehood, principles which again are broadly accepted both in law and practice. Finally, it is generally recognized that the administration of justice requires more than the promotion of freedom. In a just world, culpable harms are redressed. Not only may some forms of redress involve the restriction of basic freedoms, we may also be justified in implementing measures designed to prevent harms which in principle are not capable of compensation. Censoring the prominent publication of detailed information about where to purchase plutonium and how to build and detonate a nuclear bomb may faIl into this category. Unlike cases of, them, if he shows any strong feeling on the subject, an intemperate opponent' (51). The worry is that ifboth goods and hanns are to be viewed as subjective, as indeed they must, Mill's famous harm principle may become ineffective. 12 Defamation is typically defined as deliberate and unjustifiable injury to a person's reputation. Hence it encompasses both libel (printed -or in some other way recordedfalse, unjustified, and malicious statements) and slander (oral false, unjustified,and malicious statements). Milton's pamphlet appeared at a time crucial in the development of free speech. The invention of movable type had meant that publication was becoming comparatively common, and with publication came the spread of both heresy and sedition.]3 The result was that in 164314 Parliament passed the Licensing Order, thereby initiating the mandatory licensing and registration of all books published in Britain. The order meant that every manuscript was to be examined by a censor prior to publication. Only those manuscripts passed by the censor were granted a licence for printing and distribution. By recalling the symbolism of ancient Athens~ s public meeting place, the Areopagus, the very title of Milton's pamphlet was designed to invoke feelings of liberty and tradition.
The essence of the licensing order is summarized as follows: Having completed this first line of attack, Milton turns to his second. This is an argument based upon the claim that, if used as a means for 'the suppressing of scandalous, seditious, and libellous books,' licensing would inevitably prove to be ineffective (578). By emphasizing the suggestion that people will ultimately find a way to obtain the information they want, whether it is legally permitted or not, Milton no doubt struck another responsive chord. Although Milton offers no evidence in support of this claim, once again it is not difficult to imagine the rhetorical effect that his observation may have had upon his audience.
Milton's third argument is where he first makes use of the importance of falsehoods argument. Here Milton makes the claim that licensing 'will be primely to the discouragement of alileaming, and the stop of truth, not 15 Reprinted in Milton, 6L~20.
-only by disexercising and blunting our abilities in what we know already, but by hindering and cropping the discovery that might be yet further made both in religion and civil wisdom' (578). Later he expands his point as follows: 'Where there is much desire to learn, there of necessity will be much arguing, much writing, many opinions; for opinion in good men is but knowledge:in the maldng' (610). In Milton's mind, the free exchange of ideas is a necessary condition for the advancement of knowledge. However, exactly why this is so is left unexplained. Is it simply a contingent feature of human psychology that 'much arguing' and 'many opinions' are required for 'knowledge in the making,' or is there a deeper epistemological connection here as well? ' Milton's final argument against licensing is what we might call his resiliency argument. This is an argument to the effect that censorship is unnecessary, since, in any free and open encounter, truth will eventually triumph, defeating falsehood on its own terms without the aid of legislation. Adeptly side-stepping the question of whether his four arguments are even compatible with one another, and whether this last claim is consistent with his previous remarks to the effect that censorship will hinder the advancement of knowledge, Milton goes on to emphasize his point in one of the most influential passages ever written in English: 'though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubther strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter. Her confuting is the best and surest suppressing' (613). Yet once again, just why we should believe that truth has this resiliency, and why the presence of false opinion might be necessary for the advancement of knowledge, is left largely unexplained. In only two places does Milton attempt to justify his claim concerning the importance of falsehoods. In the first he emphasizes the vicarious but innocent pleasure one might obtain while reading about both factual and moral error:
I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed, that never sallies out and sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race, where that immortal garland is to be run for ... Since therefore the knowledge and survey of vice is in this world so necessary to the constituting of human virtue, and the scanning of error to the confirmation of truth, how can we more safely, and with less danger, scoot into the regions of sin and falSity than by reading all manner of tractates and hearing aU marmer of reason? And this is the benefit which may be had of books promiscuously read. (590) In other words, given that we may profit from the errors of others, it is preferable to do so through print, rather than in practice.
In his second discussion of this point, and I fear never will men, to whom she is but nor has she any entrance into the minds of men.
leelm:eo lJ-uvUJ::'J. the efforts of the censors, but on its own terms.
'if truth makes not her way into the her own she will be but the weaker for any borrowed force can add to her' The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is that the sale end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to someone else. The only part of the conduct of anyone for which he is amenable to society is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign (10) (11) Of course, stating such a principle is one thing, deciding how best to implement it another. As Mill explains, 'There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence: and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism' (6).
On. the issue of censorship, Mill ~grees with Milton that truth will eventually triumph in any free and open encounter. Even so, this does not mean that truth will inevitably flourish under all circumstances. Says Mill, 'the dictum that truth always triumphs over persecution is one of those pleasant falsehoods which men repeat after one another till they pass into commonplaces, but which all experience refutes. History teems with instances of truth put down by persecution. If not suppressed forever, it may be thrown back for centuries' (28). Later, he adds, It is a piece of idle sentimentality that truth, merely as truth, has any inherent power denied to error of prevailing against the dungeon and the stake. Men are not more zealous for truth than they often are for error, and a sufficient applica tion of legal or even of social penalties will generally succeed in stopping the propagation of either. The real advantage which truth has consists in this, that when an opinion is true, it may be extinguished once, twice, or many times, but in the course of ages there will generally be found persons to rediscover it, until some one of its reappearances falls on a time when from favourable circumstances it escapes persecution until it has made such head as to withstand all subsequent attempts to suppress it. (29) On this view, when placed on a level playing field, truth has a staying power which falsehood lacks. Even so, on an uneven field it may be suppressed, at least in the short run. As a result, the task of defending free expression in the face of persecution remains crucial, and Mill is straightforward in his acceptance of the importance of falsehoods argument. The free expression of both truth and falsehood, according to Mill, is necessary for the promotion of knowledge, and the censorship of any opinion hampers this goal. As Mill explains, the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error. (18) In this way, Mill encourages us to consider two cases: the first is where received opinion is false and dissenting opinion true; the second is where received opinion is true and dissenting opinion false. (This pair of cases is later expanded to allow for what Mill calls 'the commoner case,' that in which conflicting opinions 'share the truth between them.' As one might expect, this third case is reducible in all of its essential features to the first two·r 8 In the first case, Mill's defence of freedom of expression proceeds exactly as one might expect. He argues that, since no one is infallible, no one should discount the possibility that a censored opinion, believed to be false, may, In the end, tum out to be true. In response to the objection that, infallible or not, 'Judgment is given to men that they may use if (19) and that to avoid action simply on the ground that we may be mistaken is to 18 Says MilL 'It still remains to speak of Cine of the principal causes which make diversity of opinion advantageous ... We have hitherto considered only two possibilities: that the received opinion may be false, and some other opinion, consequently, true; or that the received opinion being true, a conflict with the opposite error is essential to a clear apprehenSion and deep feeling of its truth. But there is a commoner case than either of these; when the conflicting doctrines, instead of being one true and the other false, share the truth between them; and the nonconforming opinion is needed to supply the remainder of the truth, of which the received doctrine embodies only a part' (44).
abdicate responsibility in virtually every area of our lives, Mill comments as follows:
There is the greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true, because, with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation. Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right. ... No wise man ever acquired his wisdom in any mode but this; nor is it in the nature of human intellect to become wise in any other manner. The steady habit of correcting and completing his own opinion by collating itwith those of others, so far from causing doubt and hesitation in carrying it into practice, is the only stable foundation for a just reliance on it: for, being cogrusant of all that can, at least obviously, be said against him, and having taken up his position against all gainsayers -knowing that he has sought for objections and difficulties, instead of avoiding them, and has shut out no light which can be thrown upon the subject from any quarter -he has a right to think his judgment better than that of any person, or any multitude, who have not gone through a similar process. (20) (21) Thus, just as we are convinced of the importance of allowing true belief to flourish, in this case we are also convinced that there is advantage to be had in tolerating beliefs which appear to be false but which may in fact be true.
Turning to his second case, Mill is equally forthright:
Let us now pass to the second division of the argument, and dismissing the supposition that any of the received opinions may be false, let us assume them to be true and examine into the worth of the marmer in which they are likely to be held, when their truth is not freely and openly canvassed. However unwillingly a person who has a strong opinion may admit the 'possibility that his opinion may be false, he ought to be moved by the consideration that, however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth. (34) (35) This is Mill's famous 'dead dogma' argument, and here, ~t last, we are given an answer to our original puzzle concerning the importance of falsehoods. In response to the question of why false belief is important, Min points out that it is only through living argument that even true belief avoids descent into dead dogma. Why is the acceptance of truth, even carefully reasoned truth, no better than a prejudice unless we also allow for the free expression of falsehood? This question prompts an even more general question: How is it that we come to have the knowledge that we do? Obviously, much of our knowledge comes through inierence. Knowing that no prime number is composite, and knOWing that 17 is prime, we infer that 17 is not composite. Knowing that someone is a reliable authority on some subject, and knowing that he has spoken on that subject, we infer that what he says on that subject is likely to be true. Knowing that some event causes some other event, and knowing that the first event has occurred, we infer that the second event has also occurred or that it will occur. Even so, inferences such as these can never account for all knowledge. After ail, if the reason that we accept some proposition is that we have inferred it from a second proposition, and if the reason that we accept the second proposition is that we have inferred it from a third proposition, and so on without end, it is not at all clear that any of our beliefs deserve the label/knowledge.' For one thing, being finite in our abilities, we will never be able to complete even one such infinite, open-ended regress of inferences. For another, even if we did complete it, it is not clear than we would have anything other than one long conditional beliet as opposed to the categorical belief that some proposition actually is true. This line of reasoning, traditionally referred to as the regress argument, takes us some distance towards scepticism: if the only method we have for the generation of know ledge is inference, and if inference alone is insufficient for justifying even the simplest of categorical beliefs, then knowledge itself may tum out to be an illusion.
Rescuing us from the regress argument is the traditional doctrine of epistemic foundationalism. This is a two-tiered account of know ledge which allows inference chains such as the one described above to 'bottom ouf at some appropriate leveL On this view, in addition to inferred knowledge, epistemic agents will also have some form of basic or noninferential knowledge. Depending upon the particular version of foundationalism under consideration, this non-inferential knowledge may be said to result from incorrigible perceptual observations, from ind ubitabIe logical truths, or from some other basic or fundamental source. From the time of Plato onwards, various candidates for such foundational sources of knowledge have been considered; most, if not all, have been found to be inadequate in one way or another.
Specifically, two major types of objection have been raised against virtually all versions of foundationalism. The first is simply that there does not appear to be any genuinely pre-theoretical 'given' which might serve as an adequate foundation for all other beliefs. Simply put, there -do not appear to exist any genuinely indubitable, infallible, irrevisable, or incorrigible truths on which to base one's inferences. For example, contra Mill's geometry example, even a priori logical and mathematical beliefs tum out to be revisable on the basis of additional evidence, just as is the case with a posteriori reports of sense perception. Yet if revisable, in what sense can such beliefs be basic? Equally damaging to foundationalism is the related fact that all data, including both observational data and logical data, are theory-laden. All beliefs, to some extent, are a function of other beliefs and of the background theories of which they are a part. In contrast, foundational beliefs must in some important sense be epistemologically privileged. Yet no category of belief appears to be privileged in just this required sense. No beliefs are isolated from other beliefs in such a way that they may be considered the bedrock upon which all other know ledge rests.
The second main type of objection to foundationalism is that even if we were to discover some source of basic or foundational knowledge -some infallible 'given' -this source alone would likely not be enough to account for the very broad range of knowledge which we all ha ve. Simply put, there is just too great a variety of knowledge -observational, theoretical, logical, mathematical, psychological, social, pragmatic -for all knowledge feasibly to have been derived from some single narrow category of fmmdational belief.
These objections to foundationalism are telling; but they are not fatal to the project of epistemology as a whole. By themselves, they do not open the door to scepticism, provided that alternatives to foundationalism can be found. This century, several such anti-foundationalist alternatives have been developed, the most famous being coherentism.!l.O On this view, the ultimate justification of knowledge results, not via inference from some species of foundational belief but, rather, from comparisons between competing belief sets. On this view beliefs are not justified individually; rather, they are justified jointly as a result of their being a part of the most coherent belief set available to a reasoner at any given time. Thus, just as with Mill's earlier intuition, it is only through the frequent comparison of truth and' falsehood that truth is reCOgnized, and it is only through such comparisons that knowledge claims are justified. On this view it is the very act of comparison which constitutes epistemic justification.
Consider, for example, the common use of wide reflective equilibrium with regard to ethical belief. We all begin, tightly or wrongly, with a haphazard collection of normative beliefs: lying is immoral, kindness is a virtue, it is wrong to torture irmocent creatures simply for fun. Coming upon hard cases, we look to our previous storehouse of beliefs in the hope that we will find guidance. In doing so, we begin looking for some unifying principles, noticing, perhaps, that most of our previously held beliefs somehow serve to maximize human well-being, or happmess, or justice. After discovering such principles, we not only apply them to the troublesome hard cases under consideration. More than likely, we will also modify some members of our initial belief set in order to bring our previous beliefs more fully into line with these newly discovered principles. For example, in order to help maximize the coherence of our overall belief set, we may modify OUT original belief that lying is immoral, accepting in its place the belief that lying is immoral unless it aids in the promotion of some greater good. Spreading misinformation to the enemy in wartime, for example, may now be viewed as a moral, rather than as an immoral act. Such developments, in tum, may cause us once again to modify our new I y discovered principles. In this way we will continue to try to maximize coherence, stopping only when we reach some satisfactory degree of reflective equilibrium. Similar examples can be given in all branches of human knowledge, including mathematics, logic, and the social and empirical sciences.
VVhat is telling about these examples is that, in them, justification no . longer remains a linear process. According to the coherentist, choices between competing belief sets are made on the basis of criteria which may themselves be modified over time, criteria such as comprehensiveness l consistencYI explanatory power, empirical adequacy, and pragmatic utility . .21 Crucially, all of these criteria apply to belief sets as a whole. Thus, on this view, every belief is capable of beirig overturned should this be . required in order to maximize overall coherence. Empirical beliefs, for example, may be classified as specious or illusory in order that observations may be made to coincide more closely with theory. The same is also true of logical beliefs. Logical rules governing inference will of course remain a usefut and even essential, means of expanding and modifying belief sets.;:;: Even so, they too may themselves be modified, or even overturned, should circumstances warrant.
2 ) The same will be true even of b~liefs concerning . the criteria used to identify coherence itself.
Coherentism thus differs from foundationalism in this important respect. For the foundationalist, beliefs are accepted and rejected incrementally. This will be so even if we allow for the rejection and revision in principle of beliefs in addition to their acceptance. Thus it is still possible for the foundationalist to think of the ideal advancement of knowledge as a 21 Some coherentists also emphasize simplicity and the introduction of plausibility measures ln order to explain our intuition that extraordinary claims, even if useful and consistent, require extraordinary evidence in their support. 22 See GardenfOrs for a leading formal treatment. 2) For a helpful introductory survey and discussion of non-standard logics, see Haack. simple chain of inferences, moving from truth to truth, unencumbered by encounters with falsehood. In other words, it is still possible for the foundationalist to reject the importance of falsehoods argument. In contrast, the coherentist holds that comparison, not inference or some other linear mechanism, is what ultimately underlies epistemic justification. As a result, the coherentist views incremental inference as only one type of comparison between belief sets, and as a somewhat impoverished one at that.
If we return finally to the puzzle with which we began, the foregoing observations allow us to see why it is that the collision of truth with error becomes, not just desirable, but essential for the justifica tion of know ledge. In order that accepted truths not degenerate into Mill's dead dogmas it is necessary that there be competing, alternative views to which they may be compared. Since it is only through the comparison of contrasting belief sets that individual beliefs become justified, alternative belief sets are not simply something to be tolerated. Instead, they play an essential, positive role in the justification of knowledge. Given a coherentist accOtll1t of knowledge, the importance of false belief is then explained. Just as it may be rational for us to accept the claim that all lying is immoral and yet to reject this very same claim shortly thereafter (for example, upon the realization that spreading misinformation to the enemy may be a moral act), so too the coherentist will accept the claim that false beliefs may play an absolutely essential role in the advancement and justification of knowledge. In Milton's words, Ithere of necessity will be much arguing, much writing, many opinions' (610), or~ as Mill put it, comparisons between such diversity of opinion are all that stand between knowledge and the holding of truth as 'but one superstition the more' (35). On this view the censorship of even false belief will hamper the discovery of know ledge, since true beliefs can only be recognized through a series of comparisons with false ones. ' It is important to note that solving this theoretical puzzle also takes us some distance towards resolving the type of practical issues with which we began. Third-party election advertising, prohibitions against offensive language, the enforcement of false-news and anti-hate laws, and the regulation of the Internet are all issues about which there is current widespread concern and disagreement. These disagreements may be reduced once it is recognized that the importance of falsehoods argument is not Simply of tangential interest. Simply put, to the extent that decisions about these and other practical matters restrict the expression of opinion, we can expect that they will correspondingly impede the ad vancement of knowledge. Even in cases where this is not so, for example in the lucky absence of false opinion, the proliferation of Mill's 'dead dogmas' will become inevitable. The regulation of the Internet is no doubt a Significant case in point. Unless suitable provisions guaranteeing freedom of expression are included in such regulations, the licensing of web pages and the taxation of Internet traffic could have much the same effect in the twenty-first century that the Licensing Order had in the seventeenth.
Only one question therefore remains: Nothing so far explains why we should be required to tolerate a plethora of belief sets containing falsehoods. Even if coherentism, or some other form of anti-foundationalisrn, . commits us to the toleration of some false beliefs, why must we be committed to the toleration of all (or even most) false beliefs? Otherwise justifiable limits on freedom of expression aside, why will it not be permissible, at least in principle, to censor many false beliefs, including the most undesirable? The answer to this question is relativel y straightforward. Nothing in the anti-foundationalist account of justification outlined above gives us any guarantee that we will be able to rank various belief sets permanently and in such a way that we will know in advance each belief set's degree of truth. This is not surprising. Given that justified belief is not cumulative, and that our methodological principles of coherence are themselves not foundational, such a permanent rank-ordering will no doubt be impossible to obtain. As a result, we can never be sure that, upon later investigation, some belief now thought to be false may prove to be a member of a belief set with a higher measure of coherence than that of our best current theory. This, of course, is not a reason for agnosticism. Nor is it a reason for advocating the active promotion of ideas believed to be false. Nor is it a reason for failing to argue against such beliefs, or for thinking that free expression should never be subject to regulation. But it is sufficient reason for there to be a presumption -and a strong presumption -against' censorship of even the most limited kind. 24
